Concept lattices are the central notion of formal concept analysis. They are applied in many different areas such as data mining, knowledge representation or ontology engineering and are subject to ongoing research. In order to better understand the nature of concept lattices, it is useful to consider their links to other mathematical notions. For example, a concept lattice can be viewed as a special kind of poset or closure system. In this paper, we consider another view of concept lattices by establishing a link to propositional formulae and a special closure property of relations. The main result is an elementary derivation of a Horn formula that uniquely represents a concept lattice based on prime implicates. Using the derived Horn representation, we re-establish the #P-completeness of the concept counting problem and find that the Horn representation is closely related to the stem base of a concept lattice.
Introduction
Concept lattices are the central element of formal concept analysis (FCA) and are used in many applications to structure object-attribute data in an informative way. To fully determine a concept lattice, it suffices to know one of the closure systems of concept intents or concept extents (as a formal concept is determined uniquely by its intent or extent, respectively). Our goal in this paper is to derive a conjunctive normal form (CNF) Horn formula which is satisfied exactly by the concept intents of a given context.
Relationships between FCA and Horn formulae have been pointed out by several other authors during the recent years. In Berry et al. (2006) , Horn functions of general closure systems are constructed (for example the closure systems of concept intents) in order to achieve a translation of certain notions of FCA (in case of Berry et al. (2006) that of domination) into a logical framework. For our representation of concept lattices by Horn formulae, we decided on different initial conditions and definitions so that the Horn formulae produced by our approach differ from those of Berry et al. (2006) in decisive aspects. In Balcázar and Baixeries (2003) , the authors show that if a formal context is viewed as a theory in the sense of propositional logic, the attribute implications holding in the context are equivalent to the empirical Horn approximation or Horn least upper bound (as defined in Selman and Kautz (1996) ) of that theory. Here, equivalence means that the attribute sets respecting all the attribute implications are in one-to-one correspondence with the tuples of the resulting Horn theory. Thus a link between FCA and knowledge compilation, a field of research dealing with the compilation of knowledge given as an explicit list of facts into short rule-based representations, is established. The authors stop at this point, but their result eventually entails an equivalence of concept lattices and certain Horn formulae. In contrast to Balcázar and Baixeries (2003) , where the authors introduce an artificial attribute that is satisfied by no object, we can do without such extensions and provide a direct translation of FCA notions into propositional logic.
A more complete survey of the correspondences between closure systems, closure operators, implication systems and Horn functions is given in Caspard and Monjardet (2003) and Bertet and Monjardet (2005) . Those papers cover part of the considerations presented in this paper in a more general and much broader sense and many of our results can be obtained as special cases from the theorems proven there. In this paper, we chose not to make use of the abundant theory of closure operators, closure systems or Horn functions but instead achieve our results by very elementary argumentation. This approach emphasises the close relationship between concept lattices and Horn formulae which unfolds itself so naturally in the course of our considerations.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we recall the necessary basic definitions and facts from FCA and propositional logic. The derivation of the Horn formula is accomplished in Section 3 and we discuss the relationship of our result to attribute implications and the counting of concepts in Section 4. We close the paper with a summary in Section 5.
Basic definitions and facts
We now give the basic definitions and facts that we use from FCA and propositional logic. The notions from propositional logic are well known and only repeated to make the paper self-contained. Concerning the FCA terminology, we follow the notations from Ganter and Wille (1999) .
Formal concept analysis
Let G be a set of objects, M be a set of attributes and I # G £ M an incidence relation between G and M. For g [ G and m [ M, ðg; mÞ [ I is read as 'object g has the attribute m' or dually 'attribute m is satisfied by object g' and we write gIm in this case. The triple K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ is called a formal context. We consider the usual derivation operators of FCA: for A # G and B # M,
A pair ðA; BÞ, A # G; B # M, is called a formal concept if and only if A 0 ¼ B and B 0 ¼ A. In this case, A is called extent and B is called intent of the formal concept. The set of all formal concepts of a formal context ðG; M; IÞ is denoted by BðG; M; IÞ. The formal concept ðA 1 ; B 1 Þ is a subconcept of the formal concept ðA 2 ; B 2 Þ, and we write ðA 1 ;
In this case, ðA 2 ; B 2 Þ is also called a superconcept of ðA 1 ; B 1 Þ. The fundamental theorem of FCA states that ðBðG; M; IÞ; #Þ is a complete lattice called the concept lattice of K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ (see Ganter and Wille 1999) . This lattice is also denoted by BðG; M; IÞ. In the reminder of the paper, we will use the shorter terms concept and context instead of formal concept and formal context. Next, we recall some facts about concept intents. A set B # M is an intent of (a concept of) K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ if and only if B ¼ ðB 0 Þ 0 (we will use the short notation B 00 instead of ðB 0 Þ 0 in the remainder of the paper). M is always an intent of ðG; M; IÞ as all objects in the empty set trivially have all attributes. Also the set {g} 0 is an intent for each object g and is called object intent of g [ G.
It is well known that every intent of ðG; M; IÞ (except for M) is an intersection of object intents. This fact forms the basis for our derivation of the Horn representation of a concept lattice.
Propositional logic
We first introduce the syntactical objects of propositional logic as far as needed for the later discussion and then define their semantics. A lower case letter or an indexed lower case letter, x or x i , respectively, is a variable. We will only use variables that can take values in {0; 1} and call these propositional variables. Furthermore, we use the symbols _;^and 2 as well as (and) . If x is a propositional variable, then x is called its negation. A literal is a propositional variable (called positive literal) or its negation (called negative literal). A clause is a string of the form ðx 1 _ x 2 _ · · · _ x n Þ, where each x i ; i [ {1; . . . ; n} is a literal. A clause is Horn if it contains at most one positive literal. It is called definite Horn if it contains exactly one positive literal. We will denote the set of literals of a clause C by lit(C). A formula in CNF is a string of the form
. . . ; n} is a clause. If every clause in a CNF formula F is Horn, F is called a Horn formula.
Let X ¼ {x 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x n } be a set of n propositional variables with a fixed numbering and L X ¼ {x;
x : x [ X} be the set of literals over X. An assignment is a mapping A : X ! {0; 1}. An assignment A can be extended to an assignment A : L X ! {0; 1} by setting A ðxÞ ¼ AðxÞ :
x is a positive literal; 1 2 AðxÞ : x is a negative literal:
( ð2Þ By Equation (2), an assignment A on the set of literals is determined uniquely by an assignment A on the set of variables. Therefore, we will represent an assignment A : L X ! {0; 1} by the underlying assignment A : X ! {0; 1}. With this convention, we will use the notation AðxÞ for x [ L X (instead of A ðxÞ) throughout the remainder of this paper. An assignment A satisfies a clause C over X if there is at least one literal x in C with AðxÞ ¼ 1. We then call A a model of C and write A o C. An assignment A is called a model of a CNF formula F over X if A satisfies every clause in F. In this case, we write A o F. The set of all models of a formula F is denoted by Mod(F). We write A p F if A is not a model of F. An assignment A can be represented by a tuple t [ {0; 1} n by setting t i ¼ Aðx i Þ for each variable x i . This representation is unique and we will identify assignments and their representing tuples in the following. In particular, we will write tðxÞ instead of AðxÞ and t o F instead of A o F. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we will refer to a set of tuples R # {0; 1} n as an n-ary relation (or simply relation if the arity is not of interest). When we refer to the conjunction of tuples we mean the entry-wise application of the logical^-operation, for example ð1; 0; 0; 1Þ^ð0; 1; 0; 1Þ ¼ ð0; 0; 0; 1Þ:
The essential notion needed in the following is that of a prime implicate. We will use prime implicates to construct a CNF formula that is equivalent to a given relation.
We illustrate the above definition by an example. Let R be the relation given by the list of its tuples in Table 1 .
The clause C ¼ ðx 1 _ x 2 _ x 3 Þ is an implicate of R, because all tuples of R are models for C. But C is no prime implicate, because of its subclause D ¼ ðx 2 _ x 3 Þ is also an implicate of R. This subclause D is a prime implicate of R. If we remove any literal from D, we find a tuple in R that is no model for D (e.g. tuple t ð3Þ is no model for the subclause ðx 3 Þ).
It is a well-known fact that the CNF formula F that consists of the conjunction of all prime implicates of a relation R is equivalent to R in the following sense:
There are two basic types of prime implicates: redundant and non-redundant ones.
CÞ:
In other words, redundant prime implicates can be removed from the CNF formula of all prime implicates without affecting the model set of the formula.
In general, we have of course that if C and D are sets of clauses, then
: Table 1 . A relation R given by the list of its tuples.
Derivation of the Horn representation
With the definitions from Section 2, we are now ready to derive the Horn representation of a concept lattice. We first note a special property of Horn clauses.
. . . ; k} be k n-ary tuples and C a Horn clause in the propositional variables x 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x n . It holds that
This is a well-known fact which follows for example from Angluin et al. (1992) ,
is an element of R. We continue with an important and well-known fact about^-closed relations which dates back to McKinsey (1943) and Horn (1951) and can also be found in Kautz et al. (1993) , Kavvadias et al. (1993) and Hooker (2000) in a more general form than the one we prove. Our formulation, however, is sufficient and more appropriate for our considerations. Proof. Let R be^-closed and C an arbitrary prime implicate of R. Assume that C contains at least two positive literals y and z. If we denote the disjunction of the remaining literals by D, we have C ¼ ðy _ z _ DÞ. By definition R # ModðCÞ. If every tuple in R was a model of D, then D would be an implicate of R. This cannot happen because C is a prime implicate. Therefore, R contains a non-empty set of tuples T with T > ModðDÞ ¼ Y. To fulfill the condition t o C for a t [ T, either tðyÞ ¼ 1 or tðzÞ ¼ 1 must hold. If we had tðyÞ ¼ 1 (or analogously tðzÞ ¼ 1) for all t [ T, then ðy _ DÞ (or ðz _ DÞ, respectively) would be an implicate of R and C could not be a prime implicate. This implies the existence of tuples t ðyÞ with t ðyÞ ðyÞ ¼ 1 and t ðyÞ ðzÞ ¼ 0 and t ðzÞ with t ðzÞ ðyÞ ¼ 0 and t ðzÞ ðzÞ ¼ 1 in T. Let t * ¼ t ðyÞ^t ðzÞ . For t * it holds that t * p D; t * ðyÞ ¼ 0; t * ðzÞ ¼ 0 and therefore t * Ó ModðCÞ. This means that t * Ó R, which is a contradiction to the precondition that R is^-closed. Now let R be a relation whose prime implicates C j ; j [ {1; . . . ; k} are all Horn. Consider two arbitrary tuples t ð1Þ and t ð2Þ in R.
For the purpose of our derivation of a Horn representation of a concept lattice, we now provide an obvious translation of a formal context K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ into a jMj-ary relation. We will use the cross-table representation of K for this purpose, which is a table with rows indexed by objects, columns indexed by atributes and a cross in cell (g, m) if gIm. Let m 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m jMj be the attributes in the cross-table of K. We associate with every attribute m i a propositional variable x i and replace the crosses in the table by ones and the empty cells by zeros. The row corresponding to an object g [ G now represents a tuple from {0; 1} jMj denoted by t g . Finally, the tuple t M which contains only ones is added to the table. The relation gained from a context K by this translation is denoted by R K . Table 2 illustrates the translation by an example.
Remark 1. By adding t M to R K , we ensure that we arrive at a definite Horn representation (called pure Horn representation in Berry et al. (2006) ) that is each clause in the representation contains exactly one positive literal. This is what makes our approach different from Berry et al. (2006) and turns out to yield a very nice correspondence to attribute implications as described in Section 5.
The result of our translation procedure is a jMj-ary relation R K which contains one tuple for each object intent as well as the tuple t M that corresponds to the intent consisting of all attributes. Recall that all other concept intents are intersections of object intents. The intersection of object intents translates exactly to the conjunction of their corresponding tuples. Consider, for example, the objects a and c from Table 2 . Their object intents are {a} 0 ¼ {m 2 ; m 3 } and {c} 0 ¼ {m 2 ; m 4 }. The concept intent resulting from their intersection corresponds to the tuple t ¼ t a^t c :
t a^t c ¼ ð0; 1; 1; 0Þ^ð0; 1; 0; 1Þ ¼ ð0; 1; 0; 0Þ:
With this procedure, we can inductively construct to each concept intent a corresponding tuple by simply computing the conjunction of the tuples belonging to the involved object intents. We add all thus constructed tuples to R K and call the resulting relationR K . Obviously, there is a bijection between concept intents of K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ and tuples inR K . Also, because we collected all possible conjunctions of tuples from R K inR K , R K is^-closed. In fact it is exactly the^-closure of R K . By Proposition 3.2,R K can be represented by the Horn formula F K consisting of its prime implicates. This formula is the Horn representation of the concept lattice we wanted to derive.
Definition 3.3. (Horn representation). Let C 1 ; C 2 ; . . . ; C k be the prime implicates ofR K . The formula
is called Horn representation of the concept lattice defined by K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ.
Note that we use all prime implicates ofR K in the above definition. In general, F K can contain redundant prime implicates. If these are removed, the obtained formula is still equivalent toR K in the sense of (3). We use all prime implicates in our definition of a Horn representation for reasons of uniqueness. The Horn representation of the context from 
The tuples ofR K correspond to the concept intents of K bijectively. The hierarchical order of the concept intents is given by B 1 # B 2 ,B 1 $ B 2 for two concept intents B 1 and B 2 (see Ganter and Wille 1999) . It corresponds to the following order onR K : t ð1Þ # t ð2Þ ,t ð1Þ^t ð2Þ ¼ t ð2Þ :
The concept extent corresponding to the intent represented by the tuple t [R K is denoted by t 0 and can be determined by
In theory, F K can be computed from R K directly, that is one does not need to determine the (possibly exponentially sized)^-closure of R K .
Proposition 3.4. The prime implicates ofR K are exactly the Horn prime implicates of R K .
Proof. Let C be a Horn prime implicate of R K . Because of R # ModðCÞ it follows from Lemma 3.1 thatR K # ModðCÞ. Therefore, C is an implicate ofR K . C is also a prime implicate ofR K , because for all D with litðDÞ , lit(C) there is a tuple t [ R K (and in particular t [R K ) satisfying t p D.
Let now conversely C be a prime implicate ofR K . According to Proposition 3.2, C is Horn. Because ofR K $ R K , C is an implicate of R K . Assume that C is no prime implicate of R K . Then there is an implicate D of R K with litðDÞ , lit(C). C is a prime implicate ofR K and therefore there is a tuple t [R K that is no model for D. This tuple is a conjunction of tuples t ðiÞ [ R K and as C is Horn so is D. Lemma 3.1 implies the existence of a tuple t ði * Þ [ R K with t ði * Þ Ó ModðDÞ. But this is a contradiction to our presupposition of D being an implicate of R K , which completes the proof.
A Proposition 3.4 shows that it suffices to compute the prime implicates of R K , select those that are Horn, and their conjunction is exactly the Horn representation F K . However, there are several complexity results from propositional logic that imply limitations for the practical implementation of such a procedure. From a result shown in Kautz et al. (1995) , it follows that there exist contexts K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ containing only join-irreducible objects (called characteristic models in Kautz et al. (1995) ) so that the shortest Horn formula equivalent toR K is exponential in jGj. Thus a method running in input polynomial time that computes the Horn representation of any concept lattice from its context does not exist. Another result in Herbrard and Zanuttini (2003) states that a Horn formula that is equivalent to an^-closed n-ary relation R can be found in OðjRjnðjRj þ nÞÞ time. Moreover, the constructed formula contains no more than jRjn clauses. This means that we can obtain a Horn formula that is equivalent to F K in OðjR K kMjðjR K j þ jMjÞÞ time. However, the input to this algorithm would be the relationR K which may be exponentially larger than R K . Thus, the algorithm from Herbrard and Zanuttini (2003) cannot be used to generate a Horn formula representing the concept lattice of a given context in time polynomial in the size of the context. As in general large relations can be equivalent to short Horn formulae, the time complexity of such an approach would not even be polynomial relative to the input and output size. In Kavvadias et al. (1993) , it is proved that the computation of a Horn formula that is equivalent to an^-closed relationR and takes the subrelation R that contains only the essential models as an input is at least as difficult as the generation of all the transversals of a hypergraph. To our knowledge, the complexity of this hypergraph problem is still open.
Discussion
In this section, we discuss the relationship of our result to certain areas and problems of FCA.
Counting of concepts
In the previous section, we derived a Horn formula F K that represents the intent set of a formal context K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ and therefore is also a representation of its concept lattice. If we count the models of F K , we actually count the concepts of K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ and our result thus offers a possibility to determine the size of a concept lattice. However, in Creignou and Hermann (1996) a theorem is proven which implies that the counting of the models of a definite Horn formula is #P-complete in general, that is for a definite Horn formula there is a non-deterministic Turing machine whose number of accepting computation paths equals the number of models of that formula and that runs in polynomial time (see for example Papadimitriou (1994) for a rigorous definition of the complexity class #P). This is in accordance with Kuznetsov (2001) , where the #P-completeness of the determination of the size of a concept lattice is also proved. The fact that the counting of concepts is #P-complete also follows easily from the #P-completeness of the counting of ideals of a poset which was proved in Provan and Ball (1983) . If ðP; #Þ is an arbitrary poset, then the formal context ðP; P; ÜÞ contains as many concepts as there are ideals in ðP; #Þ. This also answers the question raised in Kuznetsov (2001) whether the #P-completeness also holds for distributive concept lattices because the concept lattice of ðP; P; ÜÞ is always distributive.
Distributive concept lattices
Distributivity is a strong structural property of certain concept lattices which also reflects in the Horn representation. To define distributivity, we first define the notions infimum and supremum.
Definition 4.1. (supremum, infimum). Let ðV; #Þ be a partially ordered set and x; y; z [ V. We define
x e y is the supremum of x and y and x f y is the infimum of x and y. We use the notation e and f to avoid confusion with the logical _ and^operators. This Proposition is well known and therefore we omit the proof here.
Proposition 4.4. Every definite Horn 2-SAT formula is the representation of a distributive lattice.
Proof. Let F be an arbitrary definite Horn 2-SAT formula. Then Mod(F) is^-closed as well as _-closed, because all clauses in F are Horn and dual Horn. Translating the tuples to attribute sets, this means that with two concept intents B 1 and B 2 also B 1 < B 2 is a concept intent. Thus the intent set of the represented lattice is <-closed and therefore the concept lattice is distributive. A There are distributive lattices whose Horn representation is not a 2-SAT formula. Consider the context K given by the cross table given in Table 3 . Its concept lattice is depicted on the right. It is obviously distributive. The Horn representation of K is
which contains clauses with three literals. The reason why F K is not a 2-SAT formula lies in the f-reducible attribute m 4 . We will next give some definitions that are needed during the remainder of this section. 
An attribute which is not f-reducible is called f-irreducible. A formal context from which all f-reducible attributes are removed is called column reduced. A formal context which does not contain attributes m with m 0 ¼ G is called clarified.
Note that the removal of f-reducible attributes and the removal of columns that contain only crosses from a formal context does not change the structure of the corresponding concept lattice.
Proposition 4.6. Let K be a clarified column-reduced context of a distributive concept lattice. Then the Horn representation of BðKÞ is a 2-SAT formula.
In the proof of this proposition, we will use the notation mm for the attribute concept of m, that is the concept ð{m} 0 ; {m} 00 Þ.
Proof. We show that the intent set of K is <-closed. Let A and B be the intents of concepts ab in BðKÞ. Assume that A < B is not an intent of BðKÞ (a and b are then in particular not comparable). Then, there exists an attribute m with m [ ðA < BÞ 00 and m Ó A < B. From m [ ðA < BÞ 00 it follows that m 0 $ ðA < BÞ 0 . Assume that m 0 ¼ ðA < BÞ 0 . As ðA < BÞ 0 ¼ A 0 > B 0 , the assumption means that mm ¼ a f b and m would not be f-irreducible. Therefore, m 0 . ðA < BÞ 0 must hold and thus mm is a proper superconcept of a f b. As m is f-irreducible, mm has exactly one upper neighbour x in the concept lattice. So for all concepts c with c . mm, we have c $ x. Consider the two concepts mm e a and mm e b. By the distributivity of BðKÞ, we have ðmm e aÞ f ðmm e bÞ ¼ mm e ða f bÞ ¼ mm:
If both concepts mm e a and mm e b were strictly greater than mm, then we would have that mm e a $ x as well as mm e b $ x and therefore ðmm e aÞ f ðmm e bÞ $ x . mm, a contradiction to (5). So one of the concepts mm e a or mm e b must be equal to mm. Assume without loss of generality that mm e a ¼ mm. This implies that a # mm which means that m 00 # A and in particular m [ A. This contradicts our assumption that m Ó A < B and completes the proof. A Theorem 39 in Ganter and Wille (1999) states that the completely distributive lattices D with supremum-dense set of e-irreducibles JðDÞ are equivalent to the closure systems of order ideals. In fact every such lattice D is isomorphic to the order ideals of a partially ordered set and conversely, the order ideals of every partially ordered set form a completely distributive lattice with supremum-dense set of e-irreducibles. If jDj , 1, JðDÞ is always supremum-dense and hence every finite distributive lattice is isomorphic to the order ideals of a partially ordered set. As the set of order ideals is <-closed as well as >-closed, it can be represented by a 2-SAT definite Horn formula. So from this, we can already conclude that every finite distributive concept lattice is isomorphic to a concept lattice that has a 2-SAT Horn representation.
Attribute implications
We defined R K in such a way that t M [ R K . This causes all clauses of F K to contain exactly one positive literal and they can be equivalently written as implications:
If we write instead of the propositional variable x i the attribute m i which it represents, we can translate our Horn representation to a set of attribute implications. We recall some basic definitions from FCA concerning attribute implications (see Ganter and Wille 1999) . We use sets of attributes in our notation as it is standard in FCA, but one can easily translate all statements into tuple notation by replacing sets of attributes by their characteristic vectors. The set X # M, for example, can be translated into the tuple t X defined by
An implication X ! Y follows from an implication set L if every set T # M that respects L also respects X ! Y. An implication X ! Y holds in a context ðG; M; IÞ if every concept intent of ðG; M; IÞ respects the implication X ! Y. A set of implications L is complete for the context ðG; M; IÞ if all sets of attributes that respect L are concept intents.
Obviously, the set of implications obtained from the prime implicates ofR K is complete for K by construction. Merging implications with the same premise which can generally occur in F K , we obtain the set H of attribute implications. We illustrate this procedure using the Horn representation of the context K from Table 2. The setsH and H are formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.8. (H; H). Let C ¼ {C 1 ; C 2 ; . . . ; C k } be the set of prime implicates of the relationR K corresponding to the formal context K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ. We denote by premðC i Þ the attributes in M corresponding to the negative literals of prime implicate C i and by conclðC i Þ the attribute corresponding to the positive literal of C i . ThenH is given bỹ
The set H is obtained by merging implications with common premises:
Horn representation Implications Merged implications
The implication sets H andH are equivalent, that is ModðHÞ ¼ ModðHÞ. Both can contain redundant implications because they are based on the complete set of Horn prime implicates of R K which can be redundant. Here, minimality means that if an implication is removed from L, then L is no longer complete for K.
If the redundant implications are removed from H an implication base of K is the result. Please note that whether an implication is redundant or not depends on the given set of implications. A redundant implication of H can become a non-redundant implication after another redundant implication has been removed from H. Thus, the removal of redundant implications is an iterative process. In Bertet and Monjardet (2005) , the setH is called the 'direct canonical basis'. There are five different formulations for the direct canonical basis given in that paper (and in fact one of the main purposes of that paper is to show the equivalence of these formulations). We give here the one referred to as the 'leftminimal basis' (Bertet and Monjardet 2005, Definition 9 ). We consider another implication base of FCA, the stem base (also called canonical base or Duquenne -Guigues base) first described in Guigues and Duquenne (1986) . Its definition is based on the notion of a pseudointent (see Ganter and Wille 1999) . (1) P -P 00 (2) ; Q , P; Q pseudointent ) Q 00 , P.
In the above definition, M is considered to be finite. The recursive definition of a pseudointent is not very intuitive. There is another definition based on quasi-closed sets (see Kuznetsov and Obiedkov 2006 
The pseudointents of ðG; M; IÞ are exactly the minimal (by set inclusion) elements P of these equivalence classes with P , P 00 .
The stem base is defined as: is an implication base of the context ðG; M; IÞ and is called stem base of the context. When comparing H to the stem base S of K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ, we can see immediately that for each premise P of the stem base there must be a premise X of H satisfying X # P. This is because the premises in H correspond to prime implicates and every implication holding in K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ is an implicate ofR K and thus must contain a prime implicate. We can see this already in our simple example:
The premise of the last implication in S is a superset of the premise of the last implication in H. We have already seen that each pseudointent contains the premise of an implication in H. The following two propositions shed further light on the relationship between these two sets of implications.
Proposition 4.14. Each premise in H corresponding to a non-redundant prime implicate is contained in a pseudointent.
Proof. It suffices to prove the proposition for premises inH because the premises ofH are exactly the premises of H. Let X ! y be an implication inH corresponding to a nonredundant prime implicate ofR K . This means that the set of attribute sets respectingH is a proper subset of the set of attribute sets respectingHn{X ! y}. Thus there exists a set of attributes T that respects every implication inHn{X ! y} and that is not a concept intent. Assume that no pseudointent P contains X. Consider the implications P ! p with p [ P 00 . For each of these implications there exists an implication Z p ! p inHn{X ! y} with Z p # P. According to the assumption, T respects all implications Z p ! p and therefore also the implications P ! p. This means that T respects all implications in S, a contradiction to the fact that S is an implication base for the context K. Thus, there must be a pseudointent containing X, which proves the proposition.
A Proposition 4.15 shows that there is a subset of premises in H each of which is not only contained in a pseudointent but is a pseudointent itself. Note that by construction of H out of the prime implicates ofR K , we have
Proof. Let R , X. Because X ! y is a prime implicate for all y [ Y it follows that R K y and thus R 00 > Y ¼ Y. Because X ! Y is equivalent to Y # X 00 , we obtain X < Y # X 00 . On the other hand, we have X 00 # ðX < YÞ 00 ¼ X < Y and thus X 00 ¼ X < Y which implies R 00 , X. Therefore, X satisfies the definition of a pseudointent.
A
We close this section with a remark about the minimality of the Duquenne-Guigues base. The comparison of H and S from our example context shows that both contain the same number of implications but the last implication in H has a shorter premise. In general, the stem base S allows for a more compact representation (i.e. one that uses less attributes), which can be computed from S in the following way: first S is translated into a Horn formula F S (for example, by using the translation of F K to H demonstrated above backwards). Then for each clause it is checked whether it contains a subclause that is an implicate of F S . If so, the clause is replaced by that subclause. When iterated, this procedure yields a formula consisting of prime implicates that is equivalent to S and the translation back into a set of implications is the desired compact representation of S. The basics of such a method that requires at most quadratic time in the length of the input formula F S can be found, for example, in Hammer and Kogan (1992) .
Summary
We suggested a representation of a concept lattice by a special Horn formula. This formula was constructed as a conjunction of the prime implicates of a relation R K that was derived from the formal context K ¼ ðG; M; IÞ. Theoretically, the Horn representation can be computed from the context directly but several results from propositional logic imply limitations for the practical implementation. We believe that despite of this drawback our result is interesting insofar as it reveals a close relationship between FCA and propositional logic that can be exploited to tackle research questions in both scientific areas. By using the Horn representation, we reproduced the #P-completeness of the concept counting problem. Also, we pointed to a close relationship between the Horn representation and the stem base of a formal context.
In our future research, we hope to find more links between FCA and propositional logic so that one can use the knowledge and formalism in the one area to solve problems and gain insights in the other one.
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